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Ii'l THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 
NATHAN J. HILL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant Nathan J. Hill was charged with delinquency 
based upon two counts of burglary in that he unlawfully 
remained in a building with intent to commit theft, in 
violation of Section 76-6-202, Utah Code Annotated, (1953) 
as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Merrill L. Hermansen of the Third 
District Juvenile Court accepted an admission on both counts 
of the charge. Appellant later moved to withdraw the 
admission and enter a denial. That motion was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant requests that the judgment be vacated 
and the case be remanded to the lower court with instruc-
tions to withdraw the admission and to allow the Appellant 
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to enter a denial of the charge. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On January 30, 1980 Nathan J. Hill, a juvenile, 
appeared with his father and a probation officer before 
the Honorable Merrill L. Hermansen of the Third District 
Juvenile Court. At that time he was informed that he was 
charged with two counts of unlawfully remaining in a 
building with intent to commit theft. Appellant and his 
father had been told by juvenile court probation personnel 
that an immediate admission would expedite his being 
placed on a release program to his parent. Appellant's 
father, upon whom Appellant depended for counsel in this 
matter, understood the offense to be equivalent to trespass 
and as a result Appellant did not fully understand the 
charge. Appellant and his father were told nothing about 
the range of possible punishments but only that it was a 
serious charge. The court informed Appellant that he had 
a right to discuss the charge with legal counsel before 
pleading. Nathan indicated that he did not wish to consult 
counsel and entered an admission. His father concurred in 
the decision. The court accepted the admission to two 
felony counts of burglary in violation of Section 16-6-202, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended. 
The Appellant through cou~sel later appearing in 
the case moved the court to withdraw the admission and 
-2-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
allow the entry of a denial of the charge and to set the 
matter for trial. That motion was denied May 20, 1980 by 
Judge Hermansen. 
ARGUMENT 
SINCE APPELLANT DID NOT MAKE A VOLUNTARY AND 
INTELLIGENT WAIVER OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL, THE 
COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING HIS ADMISSION AND 
ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
THAT ADMISSION. 
The Appellant contends that owing to his age, a 
lack of information, and the suggestion by the court's 
probation officer that an immediate admission would be in 
his best interest, he was not in a position to make an 
intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. It is clear 
that a person charged with a felony has an unconditional 
and absolute constitutional right to have a lawyer. 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 
799 (1963). It is also clear that the right attaches at 
the pleading stage of the criminal process. Rice v. Olson, 
324 U.S. 786, 65 S.Ct. 989, 89 L.Ed. 1367 (1945). The 
question in the present case is whether the appellant was 
adequately instructed and informed by the court to intel-
ligently waive that right. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 
506, 82 S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962) · 
In the case of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 
38 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), the Supreme Court laid 
down the standard for waiver of the accused's right to 
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It has been pointed out that "courts indulge 
every reasonable presumption against waiver" 
of fundamental constitutional rights and that 
we "do not presume acquiescence in the loss of 
fundamental rights." A waiver is ordinarily a 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right 
or privilege. The determination of whether there 
has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel 
must depend, in each case, upon the particular 
facts and circumstances surrounding that case, 
including the background, experience, and conduct 
of the accused. 304 U.S. at 464, 58 S.Ct. at 1023. 
In the present case there are several factors which militate 
against a finding of waiver. The first such factor is the 
Appellant's age. While it is true that the accused's 
minority does not necessarily preclude a finding of volun-
tary waiver, the general rule is that judges should approacl 
with particular caution any waiver by juveniles. In the 
case of Williams v. Huff, 146 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1945) a 
17-year-old accused entered an uncounseled guilty plea to 
a charge of assault with a deadly weapon, committed when he 
was 15 years of age. The record showed that the defendant 
had been advised of his constitutional right to a lawyer 
which he had expressly waived. The defendant testified t~t 
he had been advised by fellow prisoners that a guilty plea 
would improve his chances for probation. In holding that 
there had been no proper waiver the court said: 
But in this case the fact that appellant was 17 
years old at the time of the plea corroborates 
his testimony. It creates an inference of fact 
that his waiver was not intelligent. Such an 
inference would be rebutted if the record showed 
that he was examined at the time of his plea on 
the question of his intelligent capacity to waive 
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his constitutional right to counsel. Such a 
precaution is always advisable where the accused 
who waives his right to counsel is a minor. In 
the absence of such a record it is incumbent upon 
the government to show some other facts which 
rebut the inference arising from the age of the 
accused. 146 F.2d at 868. 
The U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the reasoning in 
Williams in the case of Moorev. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 78 
S.Ct. 191, 2 L.Ed 2d 167 (1957). The defendant had entered 
a hasty guilty plea partly out of fear of possible violence 
directed against him. The court said: 
A rejection of federal constitutional rights 
motivated by fear cannot, in the circumstances 
of this case, constitute an intelligent waiver. 
This conclusion against an intelligent waiver is 
fortified by the inferences which may be drawn 
from the age of the petitioner, Williams v. Huff 
355 U.S. at 165, 78 S.Ct. at 197. 
The inference against waiver established by the 
~ppellant's minority is strengthened by the fact that he 
was not adequately informed as to the nature of the charge 
and was not instructed at all as to the possible conse-
quences of pleading guilty. The charge itself was read to 
Nathan but not further explained. Nathan's father, upon 
whom Nathan was relying for counsel, understood the offense 
to be equivalent to trespass. The exact title and section 
of the Utah Code was not read, the court relying rather on 
cc he Appellant's finding that information in the summons. 
The Appellant was told nothing as to the punishment but was 
only told generally that the charge was a serious one. 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Supreme Court in Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 u.s. 
708, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed 309 (1947), outlined the respon-
sibility of the trial judge in properly instructing the 
accused. In that case the court stated: 
To discharge this duty properly in light of the 
strong presumption against waiver of the 
constitutional right to counsel, a judge must 
investigate as long and as thoroughly as the 
circumstances of the case before him demand. The 
fact that an accused may tell him that he is 
informed of his right to counsel and desires to 
waive this right does not automatically end the 
Judge's responsibility. To be valid such a waiver 
must be made with an apprehension of the nature 
of the charges, the statutory offenses included 
within them, the range of allowable punishments 
thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and 
circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other 
factors essential to a broad understanding of the 
whole matter. A judge can make certain that an 
accused's professed waiver of counsel is under-
standingly and wisely made only from a penetrating 
and comprehensive examination of all the circum-
stances under which such a plea is tendered. 332 
U.S. at 724, 68 S.Ct. at 323. 
The judge's conduct in the present case clearly did not 
meet the constitutional standard. The court did only that 
which the Supreme Court rejected as less than sufficient--
tell the accused he could have a lawyer if he wished and 
then accept his stated waiver. 
The judge's acceptance of Appellant's plea also runs 
afoul of Utah State statute. Section 77-24-6, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) as amended, which was in effect at all 
times pertinent to the present case, states: 
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Plea of guilty - Court to explain consequences. 
- Where the defendant is not represented by 
counsel, the court shall not accept a plea of 
guilty until it shall have explained to the 
defendant the consequences of such plea. 
Section 77-35-11 of the new Criminal Procedure Code 
effective July 1, 1980 preserves the essential import of 
the previous statute but provides greater detail as to the 
judge's responsibility. The new statute states: 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of 
guilty on no contest and shall not accept such 
a plea until the court has made the findings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not represented 
by counsel he has knowingly waived his right to 
counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has rights 
against compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury 
trial and to confront and cross examine in open 
court the witnesses against him, and that by 
entering a plea he waives all those rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands the nature 
and elements of the offense to which he is entering 
a plea; that upon trial the prosecution would have 
the burden of proving each of those elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the plea is 
an admission of all those elements; 
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum 
and maximum sentence that may be imposed upon him 
for each offense to which a plea is entered, 
including the possibility of imposition of con-
secutive sentences 
In State v. Banford, 13 Utah 2d 63, 368 P.2d 473 
(1962) this CJurt reversed a conviction in a case strikingly 
similar to the present one for noncompliance with the 1953 
statute. The defendant in Banford had pleaded guilty to 
a charge of Second Degree Burglary. At the time he entered 
his plea, the Court told him that he was entitled to have 
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counsel and that he could delay entering his plea 48 hours 
to secure counsel. The defendant said he did not want a 
lawyer and entered his plea immediately. This Court cited 
Section 77-24-6 and remended the case with instructions to 
withdraw the plea and allow the case to go to trial. 
The trial court's failures are not rendered harmless 
by the fact that the juvenile may have had previous exper-
ience in the courts. The U.S. 10th Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Shawan v. Cox, 350 F.2d 909 (10th Cir. 1965) 
made it clear that experience is only one of several 
factors to be considered in deciding whether there has been 
an intelligent waiver of a right to counsel. 
Appellee (the State) made little or no attempt 
to make a record sufficient to refute the oral 
testimony of appellant. We disagree with the 
trial court's finding that because this accused 
has been involved in previous criminal cases, it 
is to be inferred that he possessed all of the 
requisite understanding and intelligence to 
waive his right to counsel. That may be a fact 
to be given consideration with all of the other 
facts and circumstances in the case, but standing 
alone it is not sufficient. 350 F.2d at 912 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant submits that the court erred in 
accepting Appellant's guilty plea to two counts of burglary 
without his having legal counsel. The court should have 
been alerted to particular caution before accepting any 
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights because of the 
Appellant's age. Failure to thoroughly inform the 
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Appellant as to the nature of the charge and the range 
of possible punishments before accepting his uncounseled 
plea was in violation of the U.S. Constitution as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court and by Utah Statute. Under 
all the facts of the case this Court should remand with 
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